Quant · Risk

Concentration Is a Hidden Factor

The cap-weighted and equal-weighted S&P 500 hold identical constituents, so the gap between them measures what the weighting rule was worth. Over twenty-three years that gap is close to zero cumulatively, and it has been very large in both directions.

Issue date
Last revised
Data through
2 September 2026
Cap-weighted minus equal-weighted S&P 500 total returnUpper panel: the cumulative difference in log total return between the cap-weighted and equal-weighted S&P 500 from 2003 to 2026. The line falls through the 2000s, reaching a trough around April 2015, and rises steeply from the late 2010s. Lower panel: the same difference by calendar year in percentage points, alternating in sign through the 2000s and strongly positive in most recent years.How much of the index return came from the weighting ruleS&P 500 cap weighted vs equal weighted-30-20-10010CUMULATIVE, %200420062008201020122014201620182020202220242026Cap weighted minus equal weighted, cumulative log total return+4%trough Apr 2015-200PP PER YEAR030405060708091011121314151617181920212223242526CALENDAR YEAR, CAP MINUS EQUAL WEIGHTED TOTAL RETURNAnnual return gap, percentage pointsThe same 500 companies, two weighting rules, and a large and variable gap.This measures what concentration did, not how concentrated the index was.
Cap-weighted minus equal-weighted S&P 500 total returnUpper panel: the cumulative difference in log total return between the cap-weighted and equal-weighted S&P 500 from 2003 to 2026. The line falls through the 2000s, reaching a trough around April 2015, and rises steeply from the late 2010s. Lower panel: the same difference by calendar year in percentage points, alternating in sign through the 2000s and strongly positive in most recent years.Cap weight vs equal weight-30-20-10010CUMULATIVE, %200420082012201620202024Cap minus equal weighted, cumulative+4%trough Apr 2015-200PP PER YEAR0306091215182124CALENDAR YEARAnnual gap, ppSame 500 companies, two weighting rules.This is the effect of concentration, not a measure of it.
Figure 1 · What the weighting rule was worth Both series hold the same 500 companies and differ only in how they weight them, so the gap between them is a direct read on how much of the index return came from a small number of large positions rather than from the average constituent. The gap is large, persistent in recent years, and reverses for long stretches. It is a proxy for the effect of concentration, not a measure of concentration itself: the top-five weight and the Herfindahl index need licensed constituent weights, which this analysis does not use. Source: Yahoo Finance chart API, daily adjusted closes for SPY and RSP. Notes: Adjusted closes include distributions. The two vehicles carry different expense ratios, which biases the gap against the equal-weighted series by roughly 0.1 percentage points a year and is not removed here. The equal-weighted series begins in May 2003, which sets the sample start. Data through: 1 September 2026.

Over the twenty-three years since both vehicles have existed, the cap-weighted S&P 500 has beaten the equal-weighted version of the same index by a cumulative 3.8 per cent in log total return. That is close to nothing. Along the way the same measure reached minus 27.9 per cent in April 2015 and plus 8.8 per cent in May 2026. The weighting rule has mattered enormously in both directions and almost not at all in aggregate.

Figure 1 is that history. It is worth starting there because the familiar version of this argument, that concentration has been rising and the cap-weighted index has been pulling away, describes the last three years accurately and the two decades before them backwards.

Section 01Breadth by count, concentration by weight

The trap is the difference between two kinds of breadth. Breadth by count is the number of names held. Breadth by risk is the number of genuinely independent bets those names represent. Capitalisation weighting drives a wedge between them: when the largest constituents carry a large share of the total weight, the index behaves, for risk purposes, more like those few names than like its long tail.

SPY and RSP hold the same five hundred companies. Everything separating their returns is the weighting rule, which makes the gap between them a clean read on how much the rule was worth in a given period. In 2023 it was worth 12.5 percentage points and in 2024 12.1. In 2009 it was worth minus 18.3, and in 2003 minus 11.3. Across the twenty-four calendar years in the sample the gap has a mean of roughly zero, a standard deviation of 6.8 points, and a positive sign in half of them.

Section 02Concentration as a factor

A gap of that size in either direction is a factor exposure, whichever way it points. The mechanism is the one Figure 2 sets out: the index narrows to its dominant weights, those weights sit heavily in one sector, and that sector loads on a small set of shared drivers, including long-duration cash flows and a collective expectation about capital spending. Because the largest names share those drivers, they move together, and a shock to any one driver reaches all of them at once.

January 2025 was the live demonstration, and it is the subject of this volume's first issue. On 27 January the cap-weighted vehicle fell 1.41 per cent while the equal-weighted one rose 0.07 per cent, a single-session gap of 1.48 percentage points that sits in the bottom half of one per cent of all daily observations in this sample. Nothing about the constituent list changed. The weighting rule was carrying a position in one forecast about AI capital spending, and that day the position was marked.

A hidden-factor decomposition A two-tier plate. The upper tier decomposes what a broad index fund actually holds: a broad index of hundreds of names narrows to a few dominant cap weights, then to one sector (US technology), then to a set of shared factors (growth, long duration, AI-capex expectations), and finally to a single drawdown in which one shock hits all of them at once. A gold bracket marks the middle stages as a factor the investor did not choose. The lower tier plots index weight by constituent, sorted in descending order: a few tall gold bars dominate at the left under a steeply convex curve that decays into a long, low tail, illustrating that the effective number of independent bets, one over the sum of squared weights, is far smaller than the count of names. What a broad index actually holds breadth by count ≠ breadth by risk 01 Broad index hundreds of names 02 Cap weights a few dominate 03 One sector US technology 04 Shared factors growth · dur · AI 05 Drawdown one shock hits all a factor you did not choose Index weight by constituent, sorted few dominant weights effective bets ≈ 1 / Σ w² ≪ count of names long tail · little marginal diversification many names, by count few bets, by risk Schematic, not market data. Diversification by the count of names is not diversification by risk.
Figure 2 · A hidden-factor decomposition Index weight → one sector → shared factors → event sensitivity → drawdown A broad index can narrow, by weight and common exposure, to a small risk cluster. The inverse-Herfindahl measure captures concentration of weights; a factor model is still required to estimate how independent those exposures really are.
effective_constituents  N_w  =  1 / sum_i ( w_i^2 )      # inverse Herfindahl

    requires constituent-level index weights, which are licensed.
    N_w is NOT computed anywhere in this article.

what is computed instead:

    gap_t  =  r_cap,t  -  r_equal,t  =  sum_i ( w_i - 1/N ) * r_i,t

    the return consequence of the weighting rule, from two traded series
    holding an identical constituent list.

The distinction matters. A concentration measure would say how unequal the weights are. The gap says how much that inequality was worth in a period. A large gap implies the weights were both unequal and pointed at something that moved; a gap near zero implies one of those two failed, and the series alone cannot say which.

Section 03A portfolio problem and a stability problem

What makes this more than a private portfolio matter is that the same exposure is held in much the same form across the system, often through vehicles that can be forced to sell. In its May 2025 Financial Stability Review the European Central Bank recorded that equity markets remained vulnerable to sudden and sharp adjustments given persistently high valuations and risk concentration, and separately that liquidity mismatches in some open-ended funds, together with procyclical flow dynamics, could amplify an adverse shock. A shared exposure, richly priced, held through vehicles that must sell into weakness, is the same loop this journal meets from the strategy side in Issue 017.

Where the evidence in Figure 1 stops is worth marking clearly. It shows that the weighting rule has been worth a great deal recently, and that this has happened before with the opposite sign. It does not show that concentration is at a record, because it does not measure concentration: the top-five weight and the Herfindahl index need constituent-level weights, which S&P Dow Jones Indices licenses rather than publishes, and no proxy for them is constructed here. Nor does the recent run establish that a reversal is due. Twenty-four annual observations, half of them positive, is not a sample from which a mean-reversion claim can be made.

The label says diversified. The variance says whatever the weighting rule happened to be pointing at.

The useful distinction is between constituent breadth, weight breadth, and risk breadth. The first counts securities, the second measures how capital is distributed, the third asks how many independent exposures survive covariance. A capitalisation-weighted index can score well on the first and poorly on the other two, and the gap in Figure 1 is the only one of the three this research can measure from public data.

  • The cap-minus-equal gap measures the effect of the weighting rule, not concentration. A gap can open because the largest names outperformed for reasons unrelated to their size.
  • No concentration statistic appears in this article. The top-five weight and the Herfindahl index require licensed constituent weights and are not estimated or approximated here.
  • SPY and RSP carry different expense ratios, which biases the gap against the equal-weighted series by roughly a tenth of a percentage point a year. That is small against the annual gaps discussed but is not removed.
  • The sample begins in May 2003 because that is when the equal-weighted vehicle starts. Twenty-three years is a short sample for a series whose sign persists for years at a time.
  • RSP rebalances quarterly and SPY does not, so a small part of the gap is a rebalancing effect rather than a pure weighting effect.

This research is analysis and commentary for general information. It is not investment advice, an offer, or a solicitation, and it contains no price forecasts. Return figures are the author's own calculations from the source cited; regulatory descriptions summarise the publications named.

References & notes

  1. European Central Bank (May 2025). Financial Stability Review. ecb.europa.eu. Source for the assessments of equity valuation, risk concentration, and amplification through non-bank liquidity mismatch. Published in the same month as this issue's date.
  2. European Central Bank (May 2024). The rise of artificial intelligence: benefits and risks for financial stability. Financial Stability Review, Special Feature B. Used for the separate mechanism of correlated reliance on common models and suppliers, taken up in Issue 010.
  3. Return series for SPY and RSP are daily adjusted closes from the Yahoo Finance chart API, a secondary market-data vendor. The reproduction script and the derived annual gap series are in research/2025-05/.

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